algorithms are created by machines, they are often assumed to be immune from human biases. However, algorithms are the product of human thinking and, as such, can perpetuate existing stereotypes and social segregation. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that algorithms are not accountable. This Article explores problems related to algorithmic bias, error, and discrimination which exists due to a lack of transparency and understanding behind a machine's design or instruction. This Article deals with the European Union's legal framework on decision-making on the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR") and some Member State implementation laws, with specific emphasis on French law. This Article argues that the European framework does not adequately address the algorithm's problems of opacity and discrimination related to machine learning processing and the explanations of automated decision-making. The Article proceeds by evaluating limitations to the legal remedies provided by the GDPR. In particular, the GDPR's lack of a right to individual explanation regarding these decisions poses a problem. Furthermore, the Article also argues that the GDPR allows for too many flexibilities for individual Member States, thus failing to create a "digital single market." Finally, this Article proposes certain solutions to address the opacity and bias problems of automated decision-making. INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION
Today, automated decision systems appear to carry higher social and economic risks than ever before. We often have no information about the design or instructions the machine is given. This easily becomes a source of biases, errors, and discrimination. Indeed, an algorithm is not neutral and can perpetuate existing stereotypes and social segregation. For example, underrepresentation of a minority group in historical data may reinforce discrimination against that group in future hiring processes or credit-scoring. This Article's subject matter deals with the European Union's ("EU") legal framework on automated decision-making based on the GDPR and some Member State implementation laws with specific emphasis on French law. In Part I, I discuss the current role automated decision-making plays in our society and the need for more ethics and rulemaking to eliminate opacity and bias problems in such technology. In Part II, I present the European legal framework. Currently, the European Union and its Member States have enacted a more precise framework on automated decision-making, based on the GDPR on civil and commercial matters as well as on the Directive 2016/680/EU on criminal matters. The GDPR is completed by guidelines from the Article 29 Working Party. 1 However, I argue in particular that there is no right to an individual explanation concerning a decision based on automated decisionmaking pursuant to the GDPR. The GDPR does not provide the data subject with an individual right to know and understand the automated decision's precise basis.
In Part III, I argue that, if EU lawmakers understand the issues, their answers are not strong enough to improve the rules and protect the vulnerable population. The exceptions give too many flexibilities in favor of private stakeholders, public sectors, and the Member States. Compounding the exceptions, the related safeguards, such as the right to obtain a human intervention, do not provide for a right to an explanation either; they only afford the right to ask for a human being, and not a machine, with whom to interact. Nevertheless, this right does not ensure a better understanding of the decision. Indeed, it may not be feasible for a human to conduct a meaningful review of a process-for instance, if the process involved third-party data and algorithms, pre-learned models, or inherently opaque machine learning techniques. Moreover, intellectual property rights and trade secrets create some barriers to [Vol. XXX:91 the rights' efficiencies, and the GDPR does not furnish limitations to the application of such proprietary rights in the privacy context. Finally, no supervisory body explicitly provides for guarantees to respect such measures. Consequently, I am skeptical as to the ability of such provisions to address the opacity and discrimination problems of algorithms.
I also argue that too many flexibilities have been given to the Member States, creating a variety of differing rules. After the integration of the "EU Personal Data Package" at the national level, one can see that the common rules between the Member States are less numerous than expected. Consequently, despite the enactment of an EU Regulation instead of a Directive, 2 the European rules are too weak and too diverse to adequately protect Europeans. As a result, the GDPR also fails to create a single standard on algorithmic transparency. This has a negative impact on the ability to create a "digital single market," which is one of the European Commission's primary goals. 3 Finally, in Part IV, I consider what might be done to formulate a better framework. I propose some solutions, which have to be challenged and improved.
I. OPACITY, BIAS PROBLEMS OF AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING, AND THE NEED FOR MORE ETHICS

A. Effects of "Automated Decision-Making"
Today we live in a "Scored Society" 4 or "Black Box Society. 6 Any and all information can be collected and coded to produce an opinion on an individual or to provide a right to access to an advantage, or the denial of such. The information that is collected can be used to generate rankings used in many circumstances, such as in job applications, social benefits, or loans. 7 A person's online activity, like their interactions with social networks, is an example of the kind of information used to generate rankings. 8 This scoring system is made by algorithms instead of humans. 9 As a result of predictive algorithms making essential decisions about individuals, one's personal life can change. 10 More broadly, this means that economic activities change: financial markets, marketing, insurance, employment, education, political elections, judicial decisions, and so on. Many scholars have already shown the effects of predictive algorithms on both individual and collective situations. 11 Basically, an "algorithm" is a sequence of instructions telling a computer what to do. In the broadest sense, algorithms "are encoded procedures for transforming input data into a desired output, based on specified calculations." 12 This notion is broad and includes "artificial intelligence" processing, which itself contains machine learning and deep learning. 13 The term "artificial intelligence" applies when a machine mimics "cognitive" functions associated with human minds, such as "learning" and "problem-solving." 14 "Machine learning" is supposed to give a computer system the ability to progressively improve performance on a specific task, based on the use of data mining and massive gathering ("big data"), without explicit programming. 15 This is what is known as unsupervised learning. 16 Machine learning methods are based on learning data representations as opposed to task-specific algorithms. 17 This means that the machine "learns" by itself, in consideration of a goal previously defined by the programmer. In contrast, human intervention is mainly focused on the definition of goals (task-specific algorithms) and data used. 18 These tools analyze current and historical facts, allowing the models to make predictions (predictive models). Finally, "deep learning" architectures, such as deep neural networks, have been applied to fields including computer vision, speech recognition, and natural language processing. 19 Automated individual decision-making is based more on machine learning than on deep learning.
Though algorithms may be problematic in some ways, several positive elements exist as well. First, an automated decision-making process may be more efficient than its alternative: the information gained can be more useful and cheaper to obtain than the information gathered through human decision-making. 20 Second, although the possibility exists that an algorithm is biased, such bias often occurs because automated decision-makers were trained using biased human decisions. 21 Of course, not all training data is based on bias. One such example is credit scoring, which is based on actual payment data, not human assessments of creditworthiness. 22 an example of a situation where an algorithm may actually be less biased than human judgment. Human bias is most likely to exist in an algorithm where training data has been filtered through human intervention. 23 This is why sentencing and arrest data are bad training data.
Third, algorithms are usually more accurate than the alternative. 24 Humans make messy, error-ridden assessments of multi-dimensional information in decision-making and are subject to numerous cognitive biases. Algorithms seem to make less errorprone assessments and seem to be less subject to biases. 25 Nevertheless, we must not forget the social need to better understand algorithms and their resulting decisions. 26 Humans must maintain control of, and be accountable for, the decisions made by machines. For example, the scoring process is often seen as a good method. 27 It is considered progress in society because it is supposed to be more objective and non-discriminatory than human decisionmaking. 28 However, this is a common mistake. Algorithms are not neutral and can perpetuate existing stereotypes and social segregation. 29 Additionally, big data analytics, artificial intelligence, and machine learning's capabilities have significantly facilitated the creation of profiles and automated decisions with the potential to impact individual's rights and freedoms-especially when the decision concerns an application to enter a school or to obtain social benefits. 30 23 See id. at 4. 24 See Thornton, supra note 20, at 1825. 25 See id. at 1835. 26 Several arguments show the limits of algorithmic decisionmaking. First, predictive algorithms are based on source code, meaning that some instructions have been given and some data has been used. A bias problem exists when a computer system systematically and unfairly discriminates against groups of individuals whilst favoring others based on social or ethical criteria. 31 AI-based technologies are developed by people who may hold explicit or implicit biases against members of underrepresented groups. Bias may be introduced into machine learning processes at various stages, including algorithm design. 32 Most often, we have no information about the design or instructions given to the machine, and these could easily be a source of biases, errors, and discrimination.
See
Second, bias can also be implicit, 33 as some of the processes by which the brain uses mental associations are so well-established as to operate without awareness, intention, or control (e.g., the "White Guy problem"). 34 "Preexisting bias has its roots in social institutions, practices, and attitudes." 35 We usually have no information on the nature and source of data, 36 and many AI systems learn to make classifications by training on data sets that reflect sociocultural biases. 37 It is unsurprising that outputs of technologies replicate inequalities when they have been taught using biased data. 38 representation of a minority group in historical data may reinforce discrimination against that group in future hiring processes or credit-scoring. 39 "Profiling based on postal codes or even magazine subscriptions may become a proxy for selection based on race or gender." 40 Beyond the bias problem, the opacity of the models must also be considered. Opacity results in a reduced margin of error while rendering interpretation, human explanation, and recommendation impossible. 41 As the machine "learns" by itself, and human intervention is mainly focused on the definition of task-specific algorithms and data used, humans are not able to explain the decision-making. Furthermore, the reasoning of the machine (artificial intelligence) is not comparable to natural intelligence. The machine does not "think" as a human. Consequently, a human being is not able to pursue the lines of thinking the machine employs, and the results produced cannot be transparent and explainable. Human understanding is sacrificed in favor of an engineering perspective. This is the "black box," meaning that we do not understand the results and decisions made by algorithms. 42 Data scientists increasingly cannot explain the processes through which algorithms operate; they only find the efficiency of the results. Moreover, correlations and inferences replace causality. Consequently, these technical and legal obstacles establish asymmetric information between, on the one hand, the users of the algorithm system and, on the other hand, the persons about whom the results are generated. In such circumstances, the results cannot be audited, which is probably the best way to become aware of bias and discrimination problems.
Confirming these criticisms, Jeff Larson and his coauthors 43 denounced bias of the predictive justice system, COMPAS, 44 which 39 See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 36, at 684-85. [Vol. XXX:91 is designed to predict the likelihood of recidivism. 45 This system is used by several states in the United States at sequential stages of criminal justice, including at pretrial and community corrections, probation, jail, prison, and parole. 46 Its goals include accurate risk assessment, comprehensive needs assessment, public safety, institutional safety, fairness and racial equity, and ease of use. 47 The risk of discrimination implicates the protection of citizens' fundamental rights, and Larson and others show that the rate of false positives (high score of risk without observed recidivism) is more frequent for Afro-American released prisoners than for Caucasian released prisoners. 48 Alexandra Chouldechova has shown that the learning sample, rather than the model, is biased, because the sample reflects preexisting social biases. 49 She then proves how disparate impact can arise when a recidivism prediction instrument fails to satisfy the criterion of error rate balance. 50 Consequently, even though COMPAS pretends to conduct periodic re-validation, re-forming, and calibration studies, 51 there is a risk of increasing these biases. 52 Despite the evidence of biases in this system, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in State v. Loomis that algorithms can indeed be used to sentence defendants and, by extension, that such sentences cannot be challenged on the basis of the use of such an algorithm because the algorithm is used only as part of the decision. 53 Based on the due process rule, 54 the defendant Loomis argued that the proprietary nature of the software prevented a challenge to its scientific accuracy and the data used. 55 He also asserted that the validity of the factors used to return risk scores could include possible impermissible sentencing factors, such as gender. 56 Loomis sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which it denied in June 2017. 57 Thus, COMPAS still remains intact under the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision.
Lum and Isaac examined bias in a predictive policing system (PredPol) that was developed to flag areas where crimes may occur. 58 It appeared that the data fed into the PredPol algorithm were already biased: police arrests for drug crimes were disproportionately located in nonwhite areas, even though drug crimes were estimated to be distributed throughout the city in question. 59 Lum and Isaac then showed that, by training the predictive algorithm on these data, the algorithm inappropriately flags people from underrepresented groups as at risk of committing a crime. 60 New York City uses Palantir, another system with which the same difficulties have been observed. The tool at issue allowed data from multiple sources to be analyzed and thereby predicted where Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757. The court briefly raised concerns over how COMPAS' risk factor assessment may improperly correlate with the impermissible sentencing factor of race, before ultimately finding that COMPAS scores can still be used in sentencing. See id. at 763-764 ("Providing information to sentencing courts on the limitations and cautions attendant with the use of COMPAS risk assessments will enable courts to better assess the accuracy of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be given to the risk score."). Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence in this case also cites race as an impermissible sentencing factor. See id. at 773 (Roggensack, J., concurring). 62 Petitioner based its request on the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (Article 6 of the New York State Public Officers Law) and invoked the public's significant interest in the transparency of predictive policing systems. 63 The City of New York responded that the NYPD has to respect the vendor's trade secret and nondisclosure agreement. 64 Furthermore, disclosure of the predictive policing products' test results would discourage potential vendors from contracting with the NYPD and thereby limit the pool of technology available to it. 65 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the State of New York asked the NYPD to disclose the output data from the predictive policing system starting from six months before the date of the decision but rejected the request for disclosure of the input data. 66 This decision is a first step toward more transparency.
B. Need for More "Ethical" Algorithms and Automated Decision-Making
Algorithms and machine learning should not be viewed solely from an engineering perspective. 67 Such an approach must be complemented by a cognitive and human perspective with social considerations. 68 The lack of algorithms' oversight is socially unacceptable. 69 In this context, there is a social need for more fairness, accountability, and transparency of the algorithms 70 to challenge the biases and opacity of the results. Scholars, civil society organizations, and policymakers are increasingly asking for more algorithmic accountability, especially where individual decisions are solely based on an automatic system used by public agents. The need for "ethics of algorithms" 71 is observable in Europe 72 and also in the United States. 73 Some scholars associate algorithms with 69 Id. at 8. 70 Discussions are already underway in this arena-for example, the FAT conference (Fairness, Accountability, Transparency) on algorithmic systems is a multi-disciplinary conference that brings together researchers and practitioners interested in fairness, accountability, and transparency in socio-technical systems. 72 See, e.g., MIHALIS KRITIKOS, SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT UNIT, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, WHAT IF ALGORITHMS COULD ABIDE BY ETHICAL PRINCIPLES? 1 (2018) (providing as a European example the reinforcement of stigmatization of certain populations through measures taken by local councils in the UK which use algorithms to bring certain families to the attention of child protective services); see also Hildebrandt, supra note 26, at 41 (for instance, the draft GDPR included a provision on "the right to object and profiling," recognizing a right to object to automated decisions to protect against the possibility of being unethically profiled by algorithms). 73 The City of New York enacted a local law on automated decision systems used by agencies on January 11, 2018 (returned unsigned by the Mayor on January 17, 2018). See N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49; see also File #: Int 1696-2017, N.Y.C. CITY COUNCIL, https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D -62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0 [https://perma.cc/4YWC-T538]. According to N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49, "'automated decision system' means computerized implementations of algorithms, including those derived from machine learning or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, which are used to make or assist in making decisions . . . concerning rules, policies or actions implemented that impact the public." N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49. The scope of this law is broad: it includes the use of algorithms, including artificial intelligence and machine learning processing. The purpose is to make or assist a decision. Id. The system has to be used by an agency appointed by the mayor in compliance with section 1-112 of the administrative code of the city of New York and the decision has to have an impact on the public. Id. This law doesn't yet furnish some provisions to regulate algorithms. It only states the creation of a task force, which was nominated on May 16, 2018 and will explore how New York City uses algorithms. [Vol. XXX:91 six types of ethical problems: inconclusive evidence, inscrutable evidence, misguided evidence, unfair outcomes, negative transformative effects, and lack of traceability. 74 Broadly speaking, more transparency, fairness, and accountability are required.
Early on, the need for more transparency was demanded from the creators of algorithms. Nevertheless, one can easily understand that this is not relevant to governing algorithms because seeing does not mean knowing. 75 Seeing the inner workings of a system does not lead to understanding and controlling it. Plus, examining the code or pseudo-code would lead to a de-contextualization of the algorithm, which can frequently mutate. Although it is helpful to figure out how an existing technology works through reverse engineering, this process misses how the technology came to be this way (i.e., the socio-cultural embedding of code). 76 Besides, there are often technical limitations to a systematic approach because of the system's owners.
Consequently, our goal is not to consider the ways to "open the box." First, it may not be technically useful, because the algorithms are increasingly complex, especially the artificial intelligence systems. Moreover, the instructions could be unsupervised by programmers and hardly understandable for people. Second, having access to the algorithms once is not relevant if the instructions https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/251-18/mayor-de-blasio-first-in-nationtask-force-examine-automated-decision-systems-used-by [https://perma.cc/JM3K-7YA4]. It is the first of its kind in the United States, and it will work to develop a process for reviewing "automated decision systems," commonly known as algorithms, through the lens of equity, fairness and accountability. Id. It will provide some recommendations on how information on agency automated decision systems may be shared with the public and how agencies may address instances where people are harmed by agency automated decision systems. See N.Y.C. Local Law No. 49. More precisely, it aims to produce a report in December 2019 recommending criteria to determine which agency of the City is concerned and how implement procedures for reviewing and assessing City algorithmic tools to ensure equity and opportunity. change without predictability. Third, because of trade secret and intellectual property laws, this request may not be legally permissible in many cases. Consequently, the social need for more knowledge and understanding requires consideration of the purposes of fairness and accountability.
Some legal scholars consider the notion of "fairness" an answer to requests for social justice. 77 Nevertheless, one can observe some diverging conceptions of just how algorithms achieve it. 78 The fairness of algorithms depends on their objectives. 79 Even if decisions are statistically derived and made consistently, actual fairness is not always achieved. 80 Moreover, even if an accurate algorithm exists, it "leads to generalizations about particular groups." 81 For instance, an algorithm "comes to the blanket conclusion that men tend to deserve higher risk scores than women." 82 "[W]ould it be fair [or even legal] for individuals to be judged based on immutable characteristics such as gender?" 83 Consequently, fairness by itself is not the best way to answer the need for less discriminatory algorithms.
Accountability starts with an agent and the outcome of its actions; the data holder (controller or processor) is accountable for ensuring compliance with the principles (and rights of the data subject). 84 The data holder is also supposed to have a mechanism in place to ensure compliance. Assumptions about computing and features of situations in which computers produce outcomes create four barriers to accountability: many people collaborate on systems 77 See Kehl et al., supra note 46, at 30. 78 See id. 79 See id. 80 See id. 81 Id. 82 Id. 83 Id. [Vol. XXX:91 ("problem of many hands"); errors tend to be pervasive and inevitable ("problem of bugs"); the temptation for "blaming the computer" is strong; and software ownership is not accompanied by liability. 85 Even if the relevance of the principle of accountability is reduced in a computerized context, the need for accountability is more and more ripe. 86 Some actions decided by algorithms (i.e., automated decision-making) cause harms (or contribute significantly to causing them), and actions guided by faulty decisions or intentions (i.e., actions involving recklessness or negligence) should result in the data holder being held accountable or, eventually, liable.
I argue that current ethical requirements are too vague to enforce fair and compliant behavior of these automated decision-making tools' users. Self-regulation is not powerful enough to address these issues. Clear and binding rules are needed to fight against discrimination risks, on the one hand, and, on the other, to ensure the accountability of such automated decisions.
II. EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEMS
The European Union enacted a framework on automated decision-making (Article 22) in the General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (the "GDPR") on April 27, 2016. 87 civil and commercial matters, while Section B highlights the Directive 2016/680/EU concerning criminal matters. This Part will conclude with a discussion of the Article 29 Working Party's Guidelines on automated decision-making and profiling, which completes the EU legal provisions on automated decision systems.
A. EU Legal Framework on Civil and Commercial Matters (GDPR)
This Section focuses first on the rights of data subjects that the GDPR strengthens. The second sub-section will outline some exceptions to such rights, with their attendant safeguards. The data subject has several rights to be informed. They have (i) the right to know the existence of an automated decision-making system and that such system is used for his situation; (ii) the right to receive meaningful information concerning the logic involved; and (iii) the right to receive meaningful information on the significance and the contemplated consequences for his situation. 88 First, regardless of whether the data subject's personal data are collected from the data subject himself (Article 13, Section 2) or not (Article 14, Section 2), the controller shall provide the data subject the necessary information to ensure fair and transparent processing. 89 Given the fact that the GDPR is founded on the core principle of transparency, controllers must ensure that they explain clearly and simply to individuals how the profiling or automated decisionmaking process works. In particular, where the processing involves profiling, the basis of such profiling must be made clear to the data subject. Furthermore, Article 15, Section 1 states that "[t]he data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or 88 Id. at 41-42. Whether personal data related to a data subject are collected from the data subject (art. 13 § 2) or not (art. 14 § 2), the controller shall provide the data subject with some information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing. Id. her are being processed, and, where that is the case, access to the personal data and . . . information." 90 What information the data subject has access to is of particular concern. The language of the GDPR indicates that the data subject should have access to "meaningful information about the logic involved, as well the significance and envisaged consequences of such processing for such data subject[s]," particularly in those cases where automated decisionmaking exists, such as those referred to in Article 22, Sections 1 and 4. 91 According to the Article 29 Working Party, "the controller has a duty to make available the data used as input to create the profile as well as access to information on the profile and details of [the] segments" of the data. 92 Nevertheless, Recital 63 provides some protection for controllers concerned about revealing trade secrets or intellectual property and, in particular, the copyright protecting the software, which may be particularly relevant in relation to profiling. 93 However, the Article 29 Working Party has reasoned that "controllers cannot rely on the protection of their trade secrets as an excuse to deny access or refuse to provide information to the data subject." 94 b) Rights to Rectification and Erasure (Articles 16 and 17)
Profiling can involve an element of prediction, which increases the risk of inaccuracy. The input data may be inaccurate, or irrelevant, or taken out of context. There may be something wrong with the algorithm used to identify correlations. For example, Article 16 might apply where an individual is placed into a category that reveals something about his or her ability to perform a task, and such profiling is based on incorrect information. "Article 16 also provides 90 Id. at 43. 91 Id. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 63, at 12. 94 Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 17. to the data subject the right to [supplement] the personal data with additional information." 95 Finally, the "rights to rectification and erasure apply to both the 'input personal data' (the personal data used to create the profile) and the 'output data' (the profile itself or 'score' assigned to the person)." 96 c) Right Not to be Subject to an Automated Decision (Article 22)
Article 22, Section 1 of the GDPR concerns "[a]utomated individual decision-making, including profiling." 97 In principle, the first paragraph states that "[t]he data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her." 98 This right is directly linked with the right to know (Articles 13-15): to exercise the right not to be subject to an automated decision, the data subject first needs to know if he is subject to it. 99 The right provided by Article 22 supposes three conditions: (i) a decision was made that is (ii) based solely on automated processing and that (iii) has legal effects or similarly significant consequences. 100 Examples of this are automatic refusal of an online credit application and e-recruiting practices without any human intervention (Recital 71). 101 "The controller cannot avoid the Article 22 provisions by fabricating human involvement." 102 For example, if someone routinely applies automatically generated profiles to individuals without any actual influence on the result, this would still be a decision based solely on automated processing:
To qualify as human involvement, the controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than just a token gesture. It should be carried out by someone who has the 95 Id. at 18. 96 Id.
97
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 22, at 46. 98 authority and competence to change the decision. As part of the analysis, [he or she] should consider all the relevant data. 103 Despite the term "right," the Article 29 Working Party considers that Article 22 does not apply just when actively invoked by the data subject. 104 "Article 22 [establishes] a general prohibition" on individual decision-making, including profiling, "based solely on automated processing." 105 Consequently, individuals are automatically protected from the potential effects that this type of processing may have.
Id
Broad Exceptions to the Rights
Article 22, Section 2 provides for three exceptions to the right not to be subject to an automated decision 106 : (a) if such decision is necessary under a contract; 107 (b) if such decision is authorized by European Union or Member State laws; and (c) if a data subject explicitly consents to the decision. 108 Otherwise, the EU rule provides for a default right not to be subject to automated decisionmaking. In the United States, the assumption is that a company or agency or person can use algorithmic decision-making however it wants, unless specifically prohibited by some rule. 109 For this reason, EU law seems to provide a better framework for protecting data subjects than U.S. law. 110 103 Id. 104 Id. at 19. 105 Id. 106 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 22, at 46 (stating that "suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights . . . freedoms . . . and legitimate interests" have to be in place when the exceptions apply). 107 Id. ("If the decision: (a) is necessary for the entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller."). 108 Id. The first two exceptions were previously provided by the Directive 95/46/EC (art. 15). See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 87, at 43. Such exceptions are broad. 109 See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 104, 122 Stat. 881, 901 (2008). Here, the default is flipped: you cannot do it unless the nation has specifically permitted it. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 22(2)(b), at 46. 110 Defaults matter, empirically, and the burden to specifically allow something is much higher than the burden of doing nothing. a) Performance of a Contract "Controllers may wish to use solely automated decision-making processes for contractual purposes because . . . routine human involvement can sometimes be impractical or impossible due to the sheer quantity of data being processed." 111 "The controller must be able to show that this type of processing is necessary, taking into account whether a less privacy-intrusive method could be adopted." 112 Otherwise, "it would not be 'necessary'" and therefore not justified. 113
b) Decision Authorized by Union or Member State Law
The automated decision-making has to be "expressly authorized by [a] Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject. . . ." 114 Such automated decision-making includes, for instance, "fraud and tax-evasion monitoring and prevention purposes." 115 c) Explicit Consent
This new exception has to be defined according to Article 4, Section 11. 116 A specific consent supposes that the data subject understands the existence and meaning of automated decisionmaking and the envisaged consequences for his or her situation.
d) Safeguards to the Exceptions as Rights
In comparison to Article 15 of the Directive 95/46/EC, Article 22, Section 3 of the GDPR sets forth new guarantees. 117 When the 111 Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 23. 112 Id. 113 Id. 114 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, recital 71, at 14. 115 Id. The prevention purposes have to be "conducted in accordance with the regulations, standards and recommendations of Union institutions or national oversight bodies and to ensure the security and reliability of a service provided by the controller . . . ." Id. 116 Section 11 states that the "'consent' of the data subject [is] any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her . . . ." Id. art. 4(11), at 34. 117 Compare Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 87, at 43, with General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46. exceptions apply, "the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests." 118 These rights are a non-exhaustive list of "suitable measures." 119 The controller has to respect, at a minimum, the "right to obtain human intervention," the right for the data subject to "express his or her point of view," and the right "to contest the decision." 120 These requirements could be justified by one of the purposes of the GDPR-to improve the protection based on Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 121 Nevertheless, the right to contest the decision is not a right to reconsider it. Furthermore, human intervention is a key element, and any review must be carried out by someone who has the appropriate authority and capability to change the decision. Otherwise, this right would be useless. The reviewer should undertake a thorough assessment of all relevant data, including any additional information provided by the data subject.
B. EU Legal Framework on Criminal Matters
Council Directive 2016/680 was enacted the same day as the GDPR. 122 "Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or significantly affects him or her, to be prohibited . . . ." 125 As opposed to Article 22, Section 1 of the GDPR, this provision is a prohibition governing the data controller and not a right afforded to the data subject, which is quite different. 126 Specifically, there are fewer guarantees in the case of a breach of the law.
Article 11, Section 1 also provides some exceptions if the automated individual decision-making is "authori[z]ed by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller." 127 This exception and its safeguards are the same as in the GDPR Article 22, Section 2(b). 128 Paragraph 2 does not authorize decisions that should be based on sensitive data, except if suitable measures are in place to safeguard the data subject's rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests. 129 Nevertheless, the profiling of natural persons based on sensitive data through which they can be discriminated against is prohibited. 130
The GDPR and the Directive provide a legal framework to limit automated decision-making but are completed by Guidelines from the Article 29 Working Party. 125 
C. Guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party on Automated Decision-Making and Profiling
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, adopted on February 6, 2018, sets forth Guidelines on automated decisionmaking and profiling for the purpose of Regulation 2016/679. 131 Among all the recommendations, I will focus on the transparency and fairness requirements.
The GDPR only defines "profiling," which is related to automated decision-making. According to Article 4, Section 4, profiling is:
[A]ny form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behavior, location or movements. 132 Consequently, profiling is composed of three elements: (1) an automated form of processing (2) carried out on personal data, (3) the 131 Working Party Guidelines, supra note 92, at 2. The Guidelines reveal the issues concerning the fairness, transparency, and accountability requirements for algorithms. Id. at 6. The Guidelines note:
The GDPR introduces provisions to ensure that profiling and automated individual decision-making (whether or not this includes profiling) are not used in ways that have an unjustified impact on individuals' rights; for example:  specific transparency and fairness requirements;  greater accountability obligations;  specified legal bases for the processing;  rights of individuals to oppose profiling and, specifically, profiling for marketing; and,  if certain conditions are met, the need to carry out a data protection impact assessment [DPIA]. Id. at 6. 132 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, art. 4, at 33. object of which is to evaluate personal aspects about a natural person. 133 Article 4, Section 4 refers to "any form of automated processing" rather than "solely automated processing" (referred to in Article 22). 134 The GDPR states that "profiling" is the "automated processing of personal data [for] evaluating personal aspects" and, in particular, for analyzing or making predictions about individuals. 135 The use of the word "evaluating" suggests that profiling involves some form of assessment or judgments about a person. According to the Article 29 Working Party guidelines, profiling means "gathering information about an individual (or a group of individuals) and evaluating their characteristics or behavioral patterns" in order to categorize them, and to analyze and/or make predictions about their ability to perform a task, their interests, or their likely behavior. 136 For instance, the data broker compiles the data collected from different public and private sources to develop profiles on the individuals and places them into segments that outline important aspects of consumer needs, consumer behavior, brand preferences, product usage levels, and so on. The data broker sells this information to companies who wish to improve the targeting of their goods and services. He carries out profiling by placing a person into a certain category according to his or her interests.
Whether something is "automated decision-making," as defined in Article 22, Section 1 will depend upon the circumstances. Indeed, "automated decision-making" has a different scope than profiling and its results may partially overlap with, or result from, profiling. "Solely automated decision-making is the ability to make decisions by technological means without human involvement." 137 Automated decisions can be made with or without profiling, and profiling can take place without making automated decisions. However, profiling and automated decision-making are not necessarily separate activities. Something that starts off as a simple automated decision- [Vol. XXX:91 making process could become a process based on profiling, depending upon how the data is used. Decisions that are not solely automated might also include profiling. For example, before granting a mortgage, a bank may consider the credit score of the borrower, with humans carrying out additional meaningful intervention before any decision is applied to an individual.
Finally, according to these guidelines, there are three potential ways in which profiling may be used: "(i) general profiling; (ii) decision-making based on profiling; and (iii) solely automated decision-making," (including profiling) which may legally affect the data subject, or otherwise significantly affects the data subject. 138 Additional safeguards and restrictions apply in this third case.
The GDPR and the Directive provide a legal framework to address the social need for accountability of automated decisionmaking. Generally speaking, these rules are protective of data subjects. Nevertheless, I observe several limits.
III. LIMITS OF THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING
Despite the goal of protecting the data subjects and promoting the understanding of the issues by EU lawmakers, I argue that the given solutions are insufficient to improve the previous rules and protect the vulnerable populations against the risks of opacity and discrimination of algorithms. Specifically, the exceptions afford too much flexibility in favor of the private and public players as well as the Member States, based on the GDPR and Directive 2016/680/EU. Consequently, this protection is too weak and too diverse. Each of these shortcomings will be addressed in turn.
A. A Weak Protection Related to Automated Decision-Making and Profiling
The provisions contain many internal limits to the protection of data subjects. However, personal data legislation is not the only way to achieve the goal of protecting natural persons against algorithmic 138 Id. discrimination. Other fields of law have to be considered. Consequently, some external limits must be taken into account.
Internal Limits of the EU Personal Data Legislation a) Limits Concerning the Right to Have Meaningful
Information About the Logic Involved
The first difficulty is understanding how to satisfy the requirement of having "meaningful information about the logic involved," 139 especially in cases where a machine learning process involves multiple data sources, dynamic development, and elements that are opaque, whether for technological or proprietary reasons. 140 The growth and complexity of machine learning can make it challenging to understand how an automated decision-making process or profiling works. One should evaluate what will constitute "meaningful information" about "logic" from the perspective of the data subject. As shown above, disclosure of the algorithms' full code and detailed technical descriptions of machine learning processes are unlikely to help. "A high-level, non-technical description of the decision-making process is more likely to be meaningful." 141 Moreover, intellectual property ("IP") rights and trade secrets create some barriers, and neither the GDPR nor the Directive provide exceptions or limitations to the scope of such proprietary rights. 142 A potential conflict of legal norms between IP rights and data protection rights resolves in favor of the former.
According to the Article 29 Working Party, "[t]he controller should find simple ways to tell the data subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in reaching the decision." 143 The GDPR requires the controller to provide meaningful information about the logic involved, but not necessarily a complex explanation [Vol. XXX:91 of the algorithms used or disclosure of the full algorithm. 144 The information provided should, however, be sufficiently comprehensive for the data subject to understand the reasons for the decision. 145 Nevertheless, such provisions cannot give guarantees against biases and discrimination, and the data subject only knows the consequences of such systems and ignores potential biases. Moreover, one has no way to prove the existence of biases or avoid them. Finally, these measures are insufficient to avoid the main risks of algorithms concerning biases and discrimination.
Besides, there is a debate among scholars as to whether Articles 13-15 and 22 of the GDPR provide the right to an explanation. 146 A reconciliation 147 or explanation 148 can be found, but the explanation is not necessary. 149 Indeed, meaningful information about the logic involved does not mean a right to an explanation. It does not provide the data subject with an individual right to know and understand what exactly happened to him. Nevertheless, the "suitable measures" of Article 22, Section 3 are not an exhaustive list of rights, and "[t]he only other right that might benefit a data subject would be a right to be given an explanation for an automated decision." 150 The explicit mention of this right in the GDPR occurs only in Recital 71, which is not binding. 151 It states that: "[S]uch processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain . . . an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision." 152 Consequently, there may be a tension between the Article 22 right to obtain general information about a decision-making process and the right "to obtain . . . an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision," included in Recital 71. 153 According to some scholars, "[a]lthough not directly binding, [Recital 71] may embolden regulators and courts to try to compel data controllers to provide explanations of specific outcomes in particular cases, and not merely 'meaningful information' about 'logic' in general." 154 However, because Recital 71 is not binding, it cannot be used as a basis to claim a right. 155 Moreover, nobody knows if the European Court of Justice will broadly interpret Article 22 pursuant to Recital 71. At this step, it seems too early to affirm the existence of such right to an explanation, even implicitly. Finally, this question is not the most relevant concerning the impact of the GDPR. 156
b) Limits Concerning the Safeguards
The rights outlined in the GDPR do not include a right to an explanation. These rights merely afford the right to ask for a human being, and not a machine, with whom to interact, without ensuring a better understanding. Moreover, even if there is human intervention, it may not be feasible to conduct a meaningful review of a process. For instance, if the process may have involved third-party data and algorithms, pre-learned models, or inherently opaque machine learning techniques, it may not be possible to inform data subjects about more than the machine. 157 For its part, the right to contest a decision could be a sort of right to appeal. Nevertheless, the legal framework lacks any guarantees regarding a potential right to reconsider a decision, or even sufficient information to that effect. What will concretely happen if a data subject contests? Maybe he could lose the right to obtain a decision if he does not accept an automated one. In the event the subject gets a real second chance at obtaining another decision, there is no way to know whether the decision would be manual or automated, since no requirement as to the type exists. Affording the data subject the right to demand a manual re-examination of the decision would offer a higher level of protection.
Some limits to the right not to be subject to a decision based on automated processing (Article 22, Section 1 and Directive 2016/680/UE, Article 11) are observable in these provisions' terms. First, this right concerns the decision based "solely" on automated processing. This means that automated processing could be used without any restrictions, limitations, or guarantees if it is not the only means for making the decision. However, it is very easy to pretend that other processes are used to make a decision, although it would not be true. The lack of control prevents understanding of the decision. Moreover, decisions made by machines have a strong impact on human decisions. It is very difficult to make a different decision than the one suggested by the machine and to justify it. Second, a decision based on automated processing has to produce legal effects concerning the data subject, or otherwise to "significantly" affect them. However, the automated individual decision may have a negative or discriminatory impact without producing legal effects or significantly affecting the data subject. Moreover, what does "significantly" mean? It is difficult to draw the line between what is "significant" and not. It seems to require a high level of impact, although an impact that is not "significant" could have a very negative effect on the data subject.
The "explicit consent" provision is an exception to the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. 158 How should this exception apply? As Cate and others have said, "[t]o be sufficiently 'specific,' will a separate consent be required for each situation in which personal data are to be processed for automated decision-making, for example, in particular employment, financial, or medical contexts?" 159 Such interpretation may be too stringent for the data controller and not necessarily helpful to the data subject. Moreover, the overload of information can kill the meaning by obtaining explicit consent without being informed and being freely given. Indeed, "[i]t is standard practice, at least at the internet context, for companies to prompt data subjects to consent to various data-processing operations." 160 Besides, must the data controller provide an opportunity to revoke the consent? Moreover, even if we consider "an algorithmic process," which "can in theory be explained," how can we do that in a meaningful and intelligible way to a data subject to obtain a real consent? 161 Consequently, will it be meaningful for him? Finally, the prohibition concerning the sensitive data provided by Article 22, Section 4 also can be derogated by obtaining explicit consent. The inclusion of the exception for explicit consent impacts the data subject's interest.
To compare this with Article 15 of Directive 95/46/EC, Article 22 of the GDPR specifically accounts for profiling, 162 which was the subject of many debates during the adoption of this regulation. 163 Recital 71 provides some guarantees in case of error or discrimination. 164 These measures go in the right direction. Nevertheless, they are only provided by an unbinding recital and not by the text itself. The same limit can be found at the end of Recital 71, which adds that such a measure on the profiling should not apply to children. 165 This wording is not reflected in the article itself, so this provision does not represent an absolute prohibition, as safeguards have to be in place and appropriate for children. Such provisions are essential. However, they may only have a potential influence on the future decisions of the European Court of Justice if the Court decides to use them.
Despite the GDPR's purpose of improving the protection of Europeans in a digital context and the new basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 8), the protection does not seem so efficient. Article 22's ability to have a practical impact on automated profiling, particularly when applied to decisional systems that are complex and opaque, is also doubtful. Many activities and business models of the digital economy are based on massive data processing and algorithmic systems. Consequently, being compliant with the GDPR usually requires many changes in personal data processing in order to respect the rights of the data subjects.
to ensure, in particular, that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected . . . and the risk of errors is minimised."). The controller also should: secure personal data in a manner that takes account of the potential risks involved for the interests and rights of the data subject and that prevents, inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual orientation, or that result in measures having such an effect. Id. These provisions focus on the sensitive data, and the recital adds that "automated decision-making and profiling based on special categories of personal data should be allowed only under specific conditions." Id. 165 See id. at 14. Recital 38 states:
Children merit specific protection with regard to their personal data, as they may be less aware of the risks, consequences and safeguards concerned and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data. Such specific protection should, in particular, apply to the use of personal data of children for the purposes of marketing or creating personality or user profiles and the collection of personal data with regard to children when using services offered directly to a child. Id. at 7.
External Limits of the EU Personal Data Legislation
First, beyond the content of a specific text, such as the GDPR, a personal data statute is not necessarily the best way to ensure protection against the biases and opacity of algorithms. Indeed, the material scope of this kind of legislation is traditionally the protection of "personal data" or "personally identifiable information" from natural persons, and the goal is to achieve this protection by giving them some individual rights. 166 For instance, Article 22 of the GDPR focuses on automated individual decisionmaking. 167 What about automated collective decision-making concerning a group? Discrimination toward a group of persons can also be observed. Moreover, an individual discriminatory decision is often taken with consideration of multiple criteria, such as a category of people (e.g., black people, young people, women). Consequently, the problem of discrimination is a global one that concerns not only a specific person but, more generally, some groups of people who represent the vulnerable populations. Personal data legislation cannot properly address the issue of algorithmic transparency, and this subject matter has to be considered separately.
Finally, there are challenges with the efficiency of personal data legislation in its interrelations with other fields of law. The need for more algorithmic transparency also has to be considered in light of competition law, consumer law, and, eventually, the constitutional law of other countries (e.g., First Amendment and free speech). All of these fields overlap to address the algorithmic problems. For more efficiency, the question has to be thought of in global terms. The same conclusion applies concerning the regulator's choices. It seems to be insufficient to give the data protection authorities the task of controlling the algorithms. In the EU, many of the Member States do not have the resources to do it seriously, especially with respect to providing an oversight for the more complex and opaque algorithms.
Finally, the efficiency of the GDPR will depend on the capacity of the EU Member States to create some processes and tools to [Vol. XXX:91 enforce the law. This sort of challenge afflicts not just Article 22 rights, but more broadly the provisions of the GDPR as well.
B. A Diverse Protection Related to Automated Decision-Making and Profiling
After the integration of the "personal data package" at the national level, I point out that the commonality of the frameworks between the Member States is smaller than expected. The GDPR affords many flexibilities to the Member States to determine their requirements (opening clauses) at the national level, such as Article 22, Section 2(b). 168 As some scholars have said, "Article 22, Section 2(b) opens up [the possibility] for a great deal of nationally authorised automated decisional processes with potentially differing standards [to] be[] applied from country to country, thereby undermining the harmonisation aims of the Regulation." 169 Without pretending to consider all of these national laws, I will study the implementation of the EU provisions on: (1) civil and commercial matters, and (2) criminal matters in several Member States (France, Germany, Ireland, and the UK). All of these legal frameworks provide different rules. Such diversity challenges the purposes of the GDPR and EU politics to build a "digital single market."
National Legal Frameworks on Civil and Commercial Matters
I am specifically studying the French law because the automated decision-making requirements were originally adopted in this country. 170 Moreover, the French government has announced its goal to improve the GDPR's level of protection in the data subject's favor, for instance, in terms of the right to an explanation on automated decision-making. 171 I am also briefly studying German, Irish, and English laws. 168 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 84, at 46. 169 The "Digital Republic Act" (Loi n° 2016-1321 pour une République numérique) of October 7, 2016 anticipated some provisions of the GDPR (the "Data Protection Act" or "Act"). 172 The new Data Protection Act was enacted on June 20, 2018. 173 The Data Protection Act makes extensive use of the opening clauses to increase the level of the data subject's protection and modify Article 11 of the previous Law 78-17. 174 The Act also prohibits decisions solely based on automated-decision making. 175 Both principles provide a higher level of protection than the GDPR, which does not prohibit decisions made solely based on automated processing to predict or evaluate some of the data subject's personal details. It only provides a right not to be subject to such decisions (Article 22, Section 1). 176 Consequently, such French provisions are more protective. Nevertheless, the Article 29 Working Party Guidelines interpret Article 22, Section 1 in the same manner. 177 Some exceptions limit protections. The third paragraph of the Act follows Article 22, Section 2 of the GDPR, authorizing decisions taken solely based on automated processing when they fall under two mandatory exceptions-i.e., points (a) and (c): contracts and explicit consent, respectively. 178 This clause of the Act, by excluding any mention of exception (b) of Article 22, Section 2 of the GDPR, appears to reserve to other Member States the flexibility to enact other exceptions to their national laws. 179 The Data Protection Act further reiterates the GDPR's exceptions and the safeguards of the data subject's rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests (set forth in Article 22, Section 3 of the GDPR), providing for at least the right to obtain human intervention, the right for the data subject to express one point of view, and the right to contest the decision. 180 Moreover, the French law requires that "the rules defining this processing as well as the main characteristics of its implementation [be] provided to the data subject at his request, except the secrets protected by the law." 181 The French legislature also used the opening clause, pursuant to Article 22, Section 2(b) of the GDPR, to create a new exception for administrative decisions. 182 In this case, the data subject has to be informed about the use of an automated system 183 and has an explicit right to an individual explanation. According to the Conseil constitutionnel (the Constitutional Council), the data controller has to control the "algorithmic processing [as well as its developments] to explain, in details and in an intelligible [form]," to the data subject the way the processing was applied to his situation. 184 Such characteristics point out the machine learning methods relevant to the data subject.
In furtherance of the goal of achieving "accessibility and comprehensibility" of the law for data subjects, 185 trade secrets and IP rights have also been subjected to higher standards. The Conseil constitutionnel decided that, when the principles of the inner functioning of an algorithm cannot be communicated without infringing a secret or IP interest, no individual decision can be taken on the exclusive basis of this algorithm. 186 Such a rule has a significant impact because it is a way to reconcile, on the one hand, secrecy and property and, on the other hand, transparency and accountability.
These conditions stated by the Conseil constitutionnel reveal the need to consider the impact of tools and to check whether they are able to satisfy a legal requirement for transparency. Consequently, while algorithms that change their rules (e.g., machine learning and deep learning systems) have to be excluded, the algorithms that are protected by secrets or IP rights do not have to be excluded.
Besides, there is another problem that is not considered by the Conseil constitutionnel. One can also wonder how to monitor access to the rules defining the automated processing provided by consumer and personal data laws. Two different agencies have The German lawmakers have made extensive use of Article 22, Section 2(b) of the GDPR in a different way than the French legislators. Germany renewed its Data Protection Law on June 30, 2017. 188 Section 37 concerns automated individual decisionmaking, including profiling, and first reiterates the safeguards of the GDPR 189 before stating in Paragraph 1 a single additional exception to the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. 190 Under this new exception, decisions may be based on the processing of health data (Article 4, Section 15 of the GDPR). 191 This means that such exception applies in favor of the healthcare sector. It is too early to say what impact such a measure will have. Nevertheless, one can already observe that the choices made by the German and French lawmakers are wholly different.
ii. Ireland
Ireland enacted the Data Protection Act in 2018. 192 Article 52 concerns rights in relation to automated decision-making. 193 It also states some exceptions. 194 The exceptions are broad, and a lot of automated decisions based solely on automated processing could be authorized or required by or under an enactment in many circumstances. Moreover, even if these conditions are not required, the controller could use an automated decision if he adopts some measures to safeguard the data subject's legitimate interests. The law thus gives significant opportunity to the data controller. Furthermore, such safeguards must include the making of arrangements to enable one "to make representations to the controller in relation to the decision." 195 These exceptions seem neither clear nor stringent.
iii. United Kingdom
Despite Brexit, the United Kingdom enacted a Data Protection Act on May 23, 2018. 196 Chapter 2, Section 14 concerns the safeguards of automated decision-making authorized by law. 197 These decisions. 200 Paragraph 2 addresses other decisions. 201 Finally, paragraph 3 prohibits discrimination based on profiling. 202 This last paragraph is the same as the Directive.
The French provisions seem to prohibit predictive justice and predictive policing systems based exclusively on algorithmic decision-making. Such systems can only be used to assist decisionmaking. This interpretation is strict in a criminal matter, and the lawmaker's purpose is to protect the data subjects by refusing the use of this kind of tool. This solution is one of the more stringent ones enacted by an EU Member State. Even if decision-making is not solely based on algorithms, such tools may nevertheless substantially influence the decision-maker. b) Other European National Laws i. Germany Section 54, paragraph 1 of the new Federal Data Protection Act on automated individual decision-making states an authorization principle. 203 Distinct from French law, this permits the use of such tools in a criminal matter, with exceptions. 204 Moreover, discrimination based on profiling is also prohibited. 205 Similar to a majority of European Member States, the German lawmakers use the same words as the Directive and authorize by law a decision based solely all cite to exactly the same provisions, even though the risks may be higher in a criminal matter and the data subjects expect more safeguards.
As a procedural matter, the UK applies the GDPR and implements the Directive. However, it preserves its own way, and the ECJ has no jurisdiction to apply a judicial oversight and impose its interpretation. Consequently, it is less relevant for the UK than for the other member states to wonder whether the implementation perfectly respects the European law. Nevertheless, the effects of Brexit are not yet well understood.
Altogether, the European rules are not only too weak but also too diverse, thanks to the enactment of an EU Regulation instead of a Directive. A Digital Single Market Strategy was adopted on May 6, 2015 and was built on three pillars: (1) better access for consumers and businesses to digital goods and services across Europe;
(2) creating the right conditions and a level playing field for digital networks and innovative services to flourish; and (3) maximizing the growth potential of the digital economy. 211 Barriers result in citizens missing out on goods and services. Nevertheless, the unification of the rule concerning automated decision-making is only partial and, consequently, insufficient. This fact is problematic, especially for the private players who need to base their activities on a single rule inside the digital single market. Despite the digital single market being one of the EU Commission President Juncker's political priorities, the GDPR partially fails to achieve these goals. Additionally, the consequences of this regulatory failure are potentially catastrophic, as economic activities are increasingly based on algorithmic processing, and the technological potentials are enormous. The risk is to create different levels of protection and requirements inside the EU to regulate such tools, thus resulting in different levels of competition between the member states.
(ii) take a new decision that is not based solely on automated processing. Id. at cl. 50. 211 IV. SOLUTIONS
The algorithmic system has to be improved and not eliminated. Other means for addressing the problem of biases and discrimination are needed. I propose some recommendations, which I hope propel discussion moving forward.
First, some recommendations address the algorithmic system itself. The most important improvement should be sharing information on the system's existence, the motivation for using it, and its goal. Indeed, when data subjects can access intentions, they can better understand and challenge such algorithmic systems.
Moreover, it will be useful to explain which data went into the model (i.e., inputs) and why. Revealing these sources gives residents the opportunity to identify potential bias from data impregnated by historically discriminatory practices. Furthermore, describing how developers analyzed the data could also be a requirement without asking for publishing source code. Access to this information may allow the public to know how developers get from data to output. Additionally, the publication of the performance data creates knowledge as to whether the policy goals initially communicated are achieved.
Some restrictions related to such purposes could be requested. One also may prohibit certain kinds of algorithms if an explanation cannot be given to the individuals requesting it. Such a framework is suggested by the French Conseil constitutionnel to encourage the use of algorithms able to satisfy the transparency and accountability requirements. 212 This excludes the use of machine learning methods with the ability to improve their performance by themselves, as well as algorithms protected by secrets and IP rights. More broadly, we could encourage transparency and accountability for both the government and the private data controllers making the administrative decisions. The explanation of the algorithms' characteristics used to make governmental decisions could be extended for all kind of decisions, without consideration of the private or public sector.
Second, other requirements could concern the ability to audit the algorithmic system, for instance, by scholars or public regulators. The results produced by machine learning systems are best checked for bias and discrimination risks through an audit. Of course, the audit has to respect the guarantees of professional trade secrets. Moreover, it is not mandatory to have access to the source code to control it. Third, we have to consider the opportunity to establish a powerful regulator with a broad jurisdiction (including consumer and competition law issues) and significant capabilities. 213 An administrative remedy with strong penalties is also necessary.
Fourth, there is opportunity to question when specific and explicit rules of liability should arise, especially in determining whether the human data controller is liable, without consideration of the outcomes generated by the algorithms.
Finally, such proposed rules for algorithmic decision-making are not necessarily related to the processing of personal data. Consequently, it is better to separate them from personal data regulations and to enact specific laws for this specialized area.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I have shown that the European framework fails to address the discrimination and opacity problems of the algorithms related to machine learning processing and fails to provide a right of explanation regarding outcomes of automated decision-making. The goal of algorithmic transparency is not yet successfully ensured in the EU. The Member States could remedy this by giving more guarantees in this regard, such as the French law seems to do. However, this would create another problem, as companies and data subjects would have difficulty navigating the diversity of rules enacted by the Member States regarding algorithms and automated decision-making. Finally, I propose some recommendations for improving the awareness of and accountability for algorithmic and automated decision-making.
